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POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES. By William L. Cary. 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 1967. Pp. 149. $5.95. 
I. THE BooK 
Professor Cary's Politics and the Regulatory Agencies deals with 
the pressures upon the agencies1 exerted by the White House and the 
Congress. It is a curious work. Although the book is in good part 
autobiography. it is well-nigh barren of any hint of the intense per-
sonal feelings that must have been generated in Professor Cary's all-
too-short tour of duty as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). It is silent on classical issues that have absorbed 
the SEC in its routine functions as well as its major policy work. 
Yet the SEC plays a major role in the book, and Professor Cary's time 
at the SEC was one in which some of these issues were in critical fer-
ment. The book reveals a bias with respect to, but does not come to 
grips with, the perennially bailing question of just where, in an ideal 
framework of our government, the administrative agencies belong.2 
I. As will be apparent from tbis review, I was considerably disappointed at the 
book's avoidance of the question of just where, in the tripartite system of government, 
the agencies should belong. Certainly it is not a problem outside the scope of the 
book's title, if one is to take the word "politics" in any of its grander senses. The 
agencies have been variously referred to as "administrative" and "independent," as 
well as "regulatory." Professor Cary's very theme is the "dependence" of the agencies. 
He is perfectly justified, therefore, in avoiding the adjective "independent," If the 
choice of "regulatory" was intended to avoid the pro-executive implications of "ad-
ministrative" the victory is at a considerable expense of meaning. Almost every branch 
and sub-part of each of the major divisions of our government "regulates." 
2. Professor Cary shows succinctly how a strong President and a strong Senator may 
have equally strong but opposing views. His own view seems to be Keplerian. The 
agencies have their own orbits but are subject to the gravitational forces of the larger 
bodies-forces which are more or less strong depending on issues and personalities. 
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Yet, paradoxically, the place of the administrative agency is in fact 
the very theme of the book. 
Professor Cary has written an excellent testament of an agency 
chairman of high competence who was able to temper his dedication 
with coolness, objectivity, and balance. But a reader searching for 
broadscale meanings in the torrent of human affairs-which both 
Aristotle and Kafka would have recognized as "politics"-will be 
disappointed. A reader expecting from a former SEC Chairman deep 
insights into the agency's exciting work, problems, and people will 
have to look elsewhere. 
Since the remainder of this review will deal mainly with what 
Professor Cary did not say, the author is owed the courtesy of a sum-
mary of what he did say. 
Part 1 deals with the White House as a force at work upon the 
agencies. An agency is subject to the hazards of the quality of the man 
or men in the White House with whom it must deal. Implicit in this 
section of the book is a warning that, by and large, an agency chair-
man does well to be as aloof as possible from White House staff. In 
part, this is because a jealous Congress may be watching.8 Professor 
The ordering force in this planetary system is not an ideal about the structure of 
government but the substantive job of the agency. This may be consonant with Amer-
ican history and with our drive toward efficiency. Vvhether it is an unmixed blessing 
is another question. To deny the role of accident and power play in the making of 
our constitutional history would be fatuous. What would the Constitution "be" if John 
Marshall had never sat on the Supreme Court, if enough votes had been gathered for 
the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, or if the Roosevelt "courtpacking" plan had suc-
ceeded? Yet to deny the abiding power (and need) for permanent constitutional 
principles is dangerous. While the practical truth is almost always a vector of the 
moment's force and abiding ideal, the latter should never be the weaker. Despite a 
large body of precedent in cases and practices, and whether one uses the word "con-
stitution" to denote a specific document or a sense of ideal in government-or even 
as a description of the mood of the moment-finality in the placement of the agencies 
in a "constitutional" framework has not been achieved. One might expect a statement 
that the question is not important, that the answer can only be a temporarily valid 
one, or that the preference should be for one or the other situs for the agencies. But 
it is difficult to be content with Professor Cary's statement that President and Congress 
should use "teamwork.'' See note 5 infra. 
3. The incident chosen by Professor Cary to illustrate the dangers of yielding to 
White House pressure occurred in 1955. Sherman Adams, assistant to President Eisen-
hower, asked the Chairman of the SEC to defer the examination of a key witness in 
hearings on the Dixon-Yates affair. His reason was that government attorneys, upon 
whom the President would rely in deciding whether to take a position in the matter, 
were out of town. The Chairman conveyed the request to the full Commission, which 
granted the request. Some two years after the incident, in a Senate committee hearing, 
an important Senator branded the incident as a case of "interference" with the SEC, 
which, according to the Senator, "is an arm of Congress." From the hearing excerpt 
quoted by Professor Cary one gathers that the sin, as the Senator saw it, was not so 
much the "interference" itself but the fact that the request for continuance was sought 
from the Chairman of the SEC "who would ultimately have to pass upon the decision 
of the trial examiner" rather than from the trial examiner himself (pp. 13-15). 
The Senator's reasoning is a fancy loop which does not make a knot. The signifi-
cant difference between the President's approaching the agency chairman, rather than 
a trial examiner, with a thoroughly legitimate request is that to approach the trial 
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Cary lists the various controls over agencies available to the White 
House (appointments, preliminary budget clearances, personal con-
tacts)4 and sets them beside the pressure techniques available to the 
Congress (reminders that the agencies were created by acts of Con-
gress, open hearings, budgetary approvals, changes or threats of 
changes in administered laws). He believes that neither the White 
House nor the Congress should play for the upper hand but that both 
should operate through "teamwork" in bringing about effective 
reforms.5 
Part 2 is an anecdotal recital of the modes of pressure Congress-
men exert, or try to exert. While Professor Cary concedes the value 
of "legislative oversight" (a startling phrase which connotes a "watch-
dog" activity of Congress), and while he bows to the power of Con-
gress to influence agencies through fully passed changes in the law, 
he regrets the attempts of congressional committees to influence the 
work of agencies through "directives" collaterally made in reporting 
budget awards, pressure exerted in public hearings, or the harass-
ment of requiring from agencies elaborate reports which pre-empt 
agency time and energy. 6 
Part 3 deals with the problems of a new chairman of an "old-line" 
agency in revitalizing the agency after years of an unsympathetic ad-
ministration. (Professor Cary was a Kennedy appointee.) Oddly 
enough, in a book whose potential force is considerably frustrated 
by its frequent findings of neat balances of equities, Professor Cary 
criticizes the "balancing" philosophy of agency appointments-for 
example, the theory that the commission heading the agency should 
contain pro-industry as well as pro-consumer men, hold-backers as 
examiner would be a bizarre departure from courtesy and protocol. Of course Professor 
Cary knows this. He does not, however, say so. Perhaps he saw that the Senator's state-
ment cooked its own goose well enough without the basting of Professor Cary's com-
ment. Or perhaps the failure to make a point of it arises from the particular context 
of Professor Cary's discussion of the incident, which is not the merits of the case but 
its illustration of the dangers of embarrassment to an agency chairman from contact 
with the White House. 
4. Personal contacts with the President himself are not among those intended by 
Professor Cary as White House routes to power over the agencies. This may be true of 
his regime. At times, however, because of the importance of an issue or because agency 
people are either personally or officially implicated in inter-agency programs of high 
priority, the President's voice is heard and must be heeded. In earlier days of its history 
the SEC was an important reservoir of talent for trouble shooting in many unrelated, 
as well as related, areas of government. When close contact is had with a President, 
his power may be great without his needing to exercise it-even if only because 
agency people sense his mood and his will. 
5. To the comments already made in note 2 supra should be added that while 
teamwork between White House and Congress always exists, so does the more or less 
intense competition for power which takes place through the operation of personality 
and strategy that express themselves in the teamwork. 
6. Here, as elsewhere, Professor Cary's discussion is more valuable as anecdote than 
as principle. An agency chairman who maintains close contact with the ·white House 
might find in it relief from much of this type of harassment. 
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well as go-aheaders. Important in revitalizing the agency, according 
to Professor Cary, is to resurvey broadly its tasks, the changes in its 
regulatory environment, and the legislative tools with which it works, 
and to exert, for this purpose, pressure for higher budgets and more 
"super-grades" into which to attract and elevate good professionals. 
With characteristic fair-mindedness Professor Cary concedes that his 
own success in revitalization of the SEC through this route was in 
part luck and fortuitous historical circumstance. 
Part 4 is a case history of an agency (the SEC) maneuvering in the 
tricky currents of Washington to get a bill passed-in this case the 
extension to larger "unlisted companies" of financial reporting, 
proxy, insider-trading, and other requirements theretofore appli-
cable only to companies whose securities were listed on exchanges, 
and a raising of the qualifications of broker-dealers and others in the 
securities business. Passage of this law, it should be noted, was a sig-
nificant achievement. For more than two decades, efforts by a suc-
cession of SEC chairmen to have such a bill passed had proved fruit-
less. However, since the currents of Washington, like those of Mark 
Twain's Mississippi, are subject to unpredictable change, this log of 
the SEC's success may or may not be a useful how-to-do-it manual 
for the future. 
Part 5 sets forth Professor Cary's unobjectionable conclusions. He 
believes in smaller commissions. He believes in presidential appoint-
ment of agency heads. Finally, while he concedes that the adjective 
"independent" as applied to the agencies can be only relative, if 
indeed it is not a total "myth," the myth, he believes, should be 
preserved. 
Professor Cary's book stays well clear of turbulent waters. The 
remainder of this review will deal with two aspects of that turbu-
lence. One is the broader social context of the problems ·with which, 
in some sense or other, all agencies deal. The other is some of the 
substantive content of the work of one agency with which Professor 
Cary and I have some familiarity-the SEC. 
II. THE STORM OUTSIDE 
If the Constitution were a tool, it would have been discarded a 
long time ago. It has survived into the present because it is in fact 
a chest of tools-with new ones heaped on top of old ones and old 
ones put to uses of which their creators never dreamed. 
We tend, in American government, to do the jobs that lie to 
hand-fairly sure that somehow one of the tools already in the bin 
will serve; and, if not, that the old bin will always take a new tool. 
We have done throughout our history what each contemporary ethos 
has pushed us to do and have managed to find constitutional justifi-
cation-whether for the affirmation of property rights in human 
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slaves or, through the device of a decree in equity, for a court's tak-
ing on the running of a school system or the redistricting of a po-
litical unit. Brilliance in constitutional law has consisted of :finding 
out what it can be made to mean rather than what it does mean. 
There is, in our day, something antique about the notion of a bench 
or bar dedicated to an a priori philosophy of government and search-
ing for meanings beyond the social and ethical fashions of the day, 
whether for or against the protection of murderers and dope peddlers 
or for or against the protection of enterprise and property. 
What might be called our constitutional plasticity has had sev-
eral consequences which are vital to the character of American his-
tory. One is a dynamism uninhibited by overly self-conscious for-
malism. Another is the ease with which government takes on more 
and more jobs in a time when the social ethic tends to make every 
man's needs other men's problems. Since government tends to act in 
this way by collectivities-of people and technique-more and more 
of our conscience and work become collectivized, in and by govern-
ment. A final consequence of an extremely flexible constitution is 
our tendency to ignore it and to be as unaware of it as we are of a 
comfortable shoe. 
The sum of these consequences is an even larger and more 
troublesome one. It is a susceptibility to historical traps: to reaching 
forms of tyranny through urges to promulgate goodness; to eroding 
fundamental safeguards by constitutional fluidity; and to a prone-
ness to pass on to collective conscience and responsibility more and 
more of the personal concerns which make up the only kind of man 
worth having-the concerned man. When, as time goes on, the 
citizen's hand is removed further and further from the running of 
things (in large part because so many more things are expected to be 
done), his participation in the world's work tends to be expressed 
through his role in selecting the people whose hands move on as his 
move off. 
The historical irony is that the citizen's ability to participate in 
the selection of the people who administer his affairs goes down as 
their number and the proliferation of their tasks go up. They are 
the bureaucracy-the atomized mass of functionaries who persist 
through political upheavals and whose wall of defense is so much 
the stronger because it consists of so many small stones piled so high 
and piled in a circle from which there gets to be less and less chance 
to escape. 
The social revolution through which we are living is perhaps 
the most profound in our history. It is bigger and more pervasive 
than many of the great political revolutions and as bloody. To be 
concerned with where this revolution is taking us, as people and as 
a society, is perhaps the highest of contemporary intellectual duties. 
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Holmes sensed this and sensed that this concern should be, in par-
ticular, the dedication of lawyers. When he defined law as the self-
conscious reaction upon itself of a society seeking to determine its 
own destiny, he defined the principal mission of the lawyer.7 No book 
purporting to deal with a phenomenon as majestic as "politics" or 
one as baffiing as the administrative agency8 can be immune from 
criticism in terms of the author's willingness and ability to come to 
grips with the crises which this revolution brings upon us. 
It is from this vantage point that I am somewhat nonplussed in 
an appraisal of Professor Cary's book. It is a simple, stick-to-knitting 
treatment of the pressures on an administrative agency resulting 
from its dual dependence on the White House and on Congress. 
Professor Cary accepts the hybrid nature of the agency, without ever 
a groan of agony in attempting to resolve its place in the pattern of 
constitutional powers. He deals with down-to-earth problems, and 
his book convinces us that if all men were as fearless, as rigidly honest, 
and as competent as Professor Cary we would need neither constitu-
tions nor constitutional concerns. 
But constitutions were made to provide paths and bridles for the 
ambitious as well as the humble, for both well- and ill-intentioned 
men. The urge to goodness, lodged in men to whom good results 
justify any means, is the prime source of erosion of constitutional 
patterns, and the prime danger to which concern for the Constitution 
should be alert. And if this is so, how much more urgent is it to find 
the templates to mould the course of men not as gifted or as re-
strained as Chairman Cary? 
The Constitution can survive an amazing amount of attack. It 
does not do as well against indifference. In its way, the Supreme 
Court has recognized this in the steps it has taken to extend the 
strictures of the equal-protection clause to state inaction as well as to 
7. 0. HOLl\lES, Privilege, Malice and Intent, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 129 (1920). 
Holmes' comment was made in the course of his appraisal of the boycott cases of the 
late nineteenth century. His uneasiness with the "unconscious prejudice" and "half-
conscious inclinations" speaking through the mouths of judges led him to stress the 
importance of the self-conscious, goal-making functions of law and lawyers. 
8. Baffiing, if for no other reason than that in a government presumably structured 
by a separation of powers the agency is a sort of total government in miniature. It 
legislates (through rulemaking). It decides cases (after hearings which, despite the 
softening of "quasi," are nevertheless highly judicial in character). It prosecutes and 
defends cases in courts. It investigates. It "polices" in a broad sense and, by virtue of 
strong investigation and enforcement powers, in a narrow sense as well. 
Perhaps most intriguing about the agencies is the possibility that they illustrate our 
ability to revolutionize concepts of government without ever scratching the Constitu-
tion. Born of minds very much influenced by classical thought and eighteenth century 
rationalism, the Constitution structures government and provides checks and balances 
in terms of the classical and formal functions of government-executive, legislative, 
and judicial. What the agencies seem to illustrate is that operating divisions of govern-
ment need to be structured in terms of specific areas of economic and social concern 
as well as (or even in preference to) the classical functions. 
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state action. This kind of thinking tends to make of the Constitution 
a germinal determinant of our energies and direction. Whatever else 
one may think of the quagmire of functions taken on by the courts as 
a result of this step, it is a truly vitalizing one for the Constitution 
and a revealing one to those who are interested in the philosophy of 
history. For it illustrates the maxim that social expectations tend to 
become social goals; that in the outrunning of expectations beyond 
realities gaps are created; that these tend to be power gaps, which 
will, sooner or later, be filled.9 
Because our courts have been so quick to fill the power gaps they 
have become a principal agency in the extension of conscience into 
law. So far have they gone in realizing the dreams of men who used 
to be called "liberals" that they have belied generations of cynicism 
about law, lawyers, and courts as instruments of the propertied 
classes. Yet, in that very process, the courts have crossed state and 
federal lines and wandered freely into other chambers of the gov-
ernment mansion, taking pulses, administering clysters, prescribing 
diets-in general, assuming functions that once were conceived of as 
legislative or executive. So far, goodness has been the spur and ele-
vation the result. But I would be far from sanguine about the future 
if I did not feel that the expanded role now being played by the 
courts is only temporary-that we will, sooner or later, see a rear-
rangement of power which revests more of it with those branches of 
government more amenable than the courts to the will of an in-
formed electorate. 
III. CHALLENGES INSIDE 
Part of the history of every agency is the way in which it responds 
to the power gaps. It can default by failing to recognize and to fill 
some; it can fault by rushing in too fast to fill others. Perhaps one 
of the prime values of Professor Cary's book is his recital of instances 
of the brave agency fights, of the agonies, the victories, half-victories, 
and defeats in the never-ending tide of battles. He has modestly told 
the story of an important victory of the SEC (the amendments to the 
Securities Act of 1934) in the form of a "for instance" in the strategy 
of relations with the Congress. Thus, the recent more extensive press 
coverage of the SEC, larger budgets, and larger staffs seem to augur 
well. But a fuller appraisal of the SEC's present position and prob-
9. The idea that social expectations create political power gaps is, I believe, a 
central one. A pervading urge in us for decades was to open the country to the free 
flow of men and goods and information essential to national economy. Those were 
days when the interstate commerce clause was an overriding concern of the Supreme 
Court. No sooner was this victory sealed than the tidal wave of expectations beginning 
with our struggle out of the great depression launched us into the era of the indi-
vidual-wherever he may be and whatever doing-as a national concern. The state 
lines have been crossed; the march is now across city and township lines, into the 
classroom and the police precinct house. 
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able destiny both as a unit in its environment and as a housing for 
forces within itself requires some understanding of its extraordinary 
impotence as well as its unique strengths. 
The SEC deals with only a very small fraction of the total flow 
of capital formation. In the capital mass consisting of internal cash 
generation, private borrowing, inter-business extensions of credit, 
government financing, and public issues of securities-to name a 
few-the last named is rather small-fry. And only a portion of the 
public issues for new capital is of equities, the type of securities in 
which protection of the investor is, generally, most necessary. 
Thus the public offering registration work of the SEC, which 
absorbs a large part of its budget, screens only a small part of the 
total capital raised.10 A large segment of the horror cases in this 
portion of the SEC's work-the cases which take time and money to 
handle-are small equity issues. Yet the plain fact is that a moderate 
drop in the price of American Telephone and Telegraph may cause 
more loss for more people than would be caused by the utter failure 
of whole masses of hot and speculative issues which absorb so much 
of the SEC's attention. 
Perhaps the greatest value in the work of the SEC and in its 
policing of crooks, swindlers, and unscrupulous salesmen is the ex-
emplary and admonitory value. The actual loss caused by downright 
fraud in securities selling is undoubtedly insignificant compared 
with such figures as the amount of money spent for tinted water, 
low-grade farina in high-priced bologna, drugs which do not cure, 
or cosmetics which do not beautify. But enforcement and improve-
ment of standards of disclosure-including refinements of accounting 
standards-have spillover effects that reach far beyond the limited 
scope of the SEC's work. And the very presence of the SEC as a police 
force, like the presence of the registration requirement for new 
issues, tends to sanitize the field. 
In terms of social impact one of the most significant areas in 
which the SEC works is regulation of stock exchanges.11 The minute-
10. For example, of $81.5 billion of capital funds for non-financial businesses (i.e., 
excluding banks, insurance companies, savings and loan companies, etc.) in 1966, some 
$63.5 billion were from internal sources-principally retained earnings and deprecia• 
tion. Of the externally raised $18 billion only about $1.2 billion was from net new stock 
issues, of which some $160 million was privately placed (and therefore not registered 
with the SEC). The bulk of externally funded financing consisted of some $15.6 billion 
of bonds, of which approximately half were privately placed. SEC STATISTICAL BULLETIN 
(1966). It should be noted further that a considerable part of the securities registration 
work of the SEC involves "secondary" issues by investors-issues which do not raise 
new capital for the issuing company but raise cash for the selling stockholders. 
11. Largest of these is the New York Stock Exchange. A distant second is the 
American Stock Exchange, also located in New York. A good deal of the trading in the 
so-called "regional" exchanges-Midwest, Detroit, San Francisco, for e....:ample-is in 
securities also listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The exchange markets are 
places as well as institutions. Trading is done on the "floor" by members acting as 
brokers (i.e., agents) for their customers at the posts of specialists who also trade for 
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by-minute ebb and fl.ow of stock prices on the exchanges are in-
stantly broadcast throughout the world. Billions of dollars of current 
value are created and destroyed in these movements. The tone of the 
economy, of the society itself, is strongly affected by them. They are 
not only barometers of economic weather-they are weathermakers 
as well. 
Ideal markets are markets which respond rationally to changes 
in underlying investment values and investment prospects. But 
markets are never ideal, and are sometimes tragically the reverse. 
They can overrespond; they can underrespond; they can respond 
to irrelevancies and be indifferent to the significant. They can also 
be manipulated. As to manipulation, the law is plain and the SEC is 
as vigilant as its budget and human capacity will allow. But even if 
its antimanipulation work were entirely complete and perfectly 
successful, the effect on the markets might, I suspect, be almost un-
noticeable. The inadequacy of the markets is for most part rooted in 
the stupidity, ignorance, and greed of large numbers of wholly 
respectable people who trade in it and is in least part due to generic 
causes in the mechanisms of the market itself.12 
I have some familiarity with the organization, mechanics, mem-
bership, and management of our major exchange-the New York 
Stock Exchange. It comes close to the miraculous in its efficiency, its 
levels of honesty, and competence. Its shortcomings are due mostly 
to the massiveness of the work it must handle and the limitations on 
even the best of human capacity and private capital in the face of the 
huge task of maintaining an orderly flow of transactions and prices. 
Yet the exchanges are far from perfect. To bring them closer to 
perfection and to create a temper among public traders which makes 
possible a more rational fl.ow of prices are tasks which put at a high 
premium the exercise of a creative and prehensile imagination. In 
some sense or other the SEC acts as a sheep-dip for securities and 
securities practices. The historical reason is, of course, the back-
ground from which the federal securities legislation stems. In good 
part, this was a belief (basically well-founded, but perhaps somewhat 
their own account and who are pivots for transactions, supplying stock when demand 
outreaches supply, taking stock when the reverse is true. While a specialist is a private 
individual or firm, acting for profit, his capital and courage are important factors in 
smoothing over jagged price gaps resulting from disparities between supply and 
demand. 
12. A man whose good sense and business experience have taught him to expect 
nothing for nothing and whose whole background makes the idea of begging abhorrent 
may turn tail in stock dealings. When he asks for a "hot tip" he is, in effect, begging. 
He is assuming that someone will part with information which, if it has any value, 
the informer would wish to guard for himself. If he follows a reliable tip he may be 
participating in a rig-for the most reliable predictions of what is going to happen 
in a stock are made by those who plan to give Providence a helping hand. If he fol-
lows an unreliable tip he is a fool. 
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exaggerated) that the chicanery and malpractice preceding the 
market collapse of 1929 were significant causes of the intensity of the 
collapse. Whatever one thinks of this assumption, the fact is that 
from the first of the securities laws (Securities Act of 1933) to the 
last (the 1964 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) 
the laws have been necessary and their effect beneficial. 
But is the sheep-dip role itself wholly apt for the problems of our 
day-and of days which may soon be upon us? A root phenomenon 
of our securities markets has been the rapid increase in investable 
money in the face of a much slower increase in the supply of avail-
able investments. Even more dramatic than the long-range effects 
of this disparity are some of its short-range effects. It is not unusual 
for a hypothetical Hepatronics, Inc., with little but hope in its 
financial statements, to come out at twelve, zoom to thirty-six, and 
equally fast sink to four when detumescence sets in. Market experts 
will argue interminably about the relative roles of tax law, public 
stupidity, and stock salesmen's avidity in bringing this about. But 
underlying all is the fact of limited supply and expanding demand. 
The reinvestment of cash flow, so popular among companies (and 
investors) today and so basic a reason for the relatively slow rate of 
increase in investment vehicles, is not an unmixed blessing. There 
was a time not so long ago when some astute commentators looked 
askance at it as a major means of providing capital for expansion.13 
The once classical "bond-stock" ratio (based on the notion that 
the risk taken in stocks should be compensated for by a more liberal 
yield) has been well-nigh junked. Liberal dividends on stocks have, 
in fact, become suspect as indicators of poor growth potential. Yet if 
liberal return (tomorrow if not today) disappears as the ultimate aim 
of all investment, then nothing but a permanent trip of the securities 
markets on the upward road can justify much of stock market action. 
13. B. GRAHAM &: D. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS (1934). The authors, committed to 
the classical notion that the purpose of investment is return, regarded the basic 
fallacy of defenders of plow-back to be their failure to recognize that, even when 
it makes good sense for the business, it may not make equal sense for the stockholders. 
Id. at 329. 
At times the difficulty is not with plow-back itself but with the way it is interpreted. 
Let us suppose that, in the midst of a labor negotiation, management realizes that it is 
going to have to grant at least a 5% increase in wages-or the equivalent. If labor 
costs are, say, 50% of the company's operating costs, the increase will result in a 2.5% 
increase in operating expenses before taxes. It may be able to pass some of this on to 
its customers. But the likelihood is that its suppliers, facing the same squeeze, are 
going to pass their labor cost increases on to the company. The only safe assumption 
is that the increase will have to be offset by increased efficiency. New machines, new 
processes, to bring about efficiency will, in all likelihood, be financed out of cash flow, 
including retained earnings. Thus, to a great extent, yesterday's profits are plowed 
back just to stand still. ·were they therefore really profits? Further, whatever the reason 
for the plow-back, it may be only minimally successful-o:i: it may even fail. Yet the 
tendency is indiscriminately to take the accountant's classification of "retained earnings" 
for granted and to look favorably upon the plow-back of these earnings as a sign of 
"growth." It may be a sign of desperation. 
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Whether the markets can or should take this trip is one question. 
Quite another is whether a market that must continue to give 
capital gains (as against a reasonable return on investment) may not 
be a lit fuse in our economy. 
The recent years have been a trying time for investors and analysts 
of what might now be regarded as "the old school." These are people 
whose philosophy is based on the assumption that, in the long run, 
the market price of a stock will reflect the course of its value-up or 
down. Sensitivity to short-term market price fluctuations was always 
important, but primarily as a basis for advantageous buying or 
selling, ultimately based on value judgments. Now short-term fluctua-
tion is on the way to being the sole determinant for many people 
of what to buy or sell. In recent markets, with buoyant prices for 
"glamor" stocks and lagging prices for proved and established 
equities, value judgment may not as often have paid off as have flings 
in high-flyers, regardless of basic values. The long run for which 
value judgment waits has, to the despair of many, become longer and 
longer. 
All of this is draining out the relevance, for more and more 
people, of the major aspect of the SEC's work-disclosure designed 
to permit the making of prudent judgments about underlying values. 
The SEC cannot be indifferent to this fact. But within the present 
framework of its jurisdiction it can do very little about it. The roots 
of the problem are deep, reaching into the mainsprings of human 
and corporate motivations: they extend into tax policy, monetary 
and :fiscal policy-including the old "new" economics-wars, welfare, 
and beyond. 
Certainly continued and increasing stress on disclosure is needed. 
But more certainly it must be recognized that the vitalization of the 
SEC calls for more than merely more people doing more eagerly more 
of the same work that has been done for a long time. The prehensile 
imagination must break treadmill circles and move outward. That 
it must clamor to be heard by those who make tax, :fiscal, monetary, 
and general economic policy is not the end of hope but the beginning 
of a task. 
But even within the circles of the SEC's endless round there are 
classical problems worth mentioning. One of these is a competition 
of basic philosophies. While disclosure has traditionally been the 
keystone of the arch of federal securities legislation and has been 
the dominating drive of the SEC, there has always existed a counter-
vailing force within the SEC whose :first impulse is not to cure with 
disclosure but to kill by prohibition. 
The two approaches-disclosure and prohibition-are inter-
woven in the fabric of regulation. The relative emphasis on the one 
or the other stems not only from the framework of legislative au-
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thority but also from the character of administrators. The man whose 
first impulse is to insist on full disclosure and thereafter leave people 
free to make their own judgments demonstrates by this fact a point of 
view about the nature of people and the role of government. It is a 
point of view consonant with a classical belief in the perfectibility 
of man, in the possibility of self-improvement, and in the efficacy 
of enlightened self-interest and with the very hope for a democratic 
process which is not merely ethically desirable but practically 
effective.14 The prohibitor's psychology implies, equally strongly, 
different points of view. It pretends to possess the power to distin-
guish between what is good and what is bad. It refuses to credit 
people with either the ability to use information or the hope of 
learning to use it. The belief is often generated out of sincere desire 
to prevent harm and promote good. Its fundamental danger is that 
these impulses expressed in prohibitions can lead to benevolent 
despotism and leave us open to the danger of a despotism which is 
less than benevolent. 
Administrative discretion is the mortar that holds together the 
great blocks of legislative structure under which the SEC acts. In 
the authority to time the clearance of a registration or proxy state-
ment, in the ability to stretch disclosure requirements, by insistence 
or innuendo, the SEC's staff enjoys tremendous power to hinder 
or facilitate (depending on its view of the merits of a proposed cor-
porate transaction), even while administering only a disclosure re-
quirement. For this reason the nature of the man who administers 
the law can be virtually determinative of whether it will work as a 
disclosure requirement or will be used as an instrument for the 
imposition of fiat. 
Some staff members who have spent years with the SEC tend 
to be like policemen who have spent years on the force. They develop, 
often slowly and imperceptibly, a jaundiced view of human nature. 
They begin to believe that the public can be helped best by denying 
access to it by "crooks"-a broad term which is sometimes used to 
include promoters of worthwhile but untested ventures.15 
14. Various "blue-sky" laws (state laws regulating securities issues) either expressly 
grant or are construed to grant power to state administrators to ban issues for reasons 
related to their investment "quality." These standards have not, by and large, proved 
effective. Administratively developed tests-such as a three-year record of dividends-
are likely to be entirely inadequate in an appraisal of quality but tend to act as substi-
tutes for rational tests of quality. Pet foibles of one kind or another-such as in-
sistence on cumulative voting rights-often screen out high-quality issues. Unleashed 
judgment operating under a vague and broad standard-such as "sound" capital struc-
ture-can give play to prejudice parading as judgment. The alternative to the tolerance 
so widely used by state administrators with strong prohibitory powers is nit-picking of 
equally dubious value in the protection of investors. For a general discussion, see 
L. Loss & E. CoWETI, BLUE SKY LAw 67 (1958). 
15. I have heard strong defenders of disclosure in securities transactions insist tliat 
some very drastic prohibitional steps ought to be taken in the campaign against 
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From the human point of view one can understand this process. 
From the social point of view it is an extremely dangerous one. 
Despite enormous strides made by the SEC in deepening and broad-
ening the role of disclosure in securities transactions, the public still 
tends to respond to tip, hunch, and rumor-most often to its loss. 
It may take more than one generation of administrators to make the 
slow progress which is all one can expect in this field. But it takes 
only one generation of administrators to kill the hope of progress by 
losing heart and taking the easy route of fiat against the painful and 
stumbling route of disclosure. 
The premium on keeping this faith alive in staff members is 
extraordinarily high. Fiat works. Because of that fact it tempts the 
regulator into further and further uses of it. Yet every step taken 
in the exercise of fiat is the death of a hope for the only kind of 
investor protection which is both permanent and valuable: self-
protection. 
Professor Cary was the spearhead of recent amendments to the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 which resulted in a long overdue exten-
sion of disclosure requirements to companies whose securities are not 
traded on the exchanges. He was an able and dedicated administrator 
of the disclosure requirements in his work as Chairman of the SEC. 
Yet in a casual reference to changes which he feels might be needed 
in the Investment Company Act of 1940 he asks whether, in the 
regulation of mutual funds, disclosure should not give way to fiat 
in the remaking of important statutory patterns. He has more than 
earned the right to his point of view through his experience in 
regulation. I happen to differ with him in this case. To substitute 
fiat for disclosure would be a serious blow to progress in self-
protection for a segment of the investment public that urgently 
needs it. However, my cavil with Professor Cary is not so much over 
this difference in substance but over the casualness of his treatment 
of a basic and difficult issue.16 
Another casual reference by Professor Cary is to the question of 
whether the SEC should retain jurisdiction to administer the Public 
cigarettes and whiskey. The closer one reaches to strong feelings the closer one comes to 
fiat. The real test of a good administrator is the strength of his resolve to pursue the 
disclosure route in the face of his strong feelings, not his weak ones. 
16. Even a sketch of the merits of the SEC's controversy with the mutual fund in-
dustry would be far beyond the scope of this review. But it should suffice to note in 
this connection that the SEC has proposed among other things, a substantial reduction 
in the present prevailing scale of fund share acquisition costs. It has also proposed ban-
ning certain methods of charging acquisition costs known as front-end loading. These 
questions are sufficiently important as related to a competitive industry acting under 
extensive and rigidly enforced disclosure requirements to merit some discussion. Similar 
but more complex issues are raised by the SEC's proposal that a statutory standard of 
reasonableness be imposed on mutual fund management fees. Even so slender a volume 
as Professor Cary's book could carry a deeper explanation of his views on these im-
portant proposals. 
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Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. This law, and the SEC's 
achievements under it, resulted (in a period of less than two decades) 
in an enormously valuable restructuring of public utility holding 
company systems, both gas and electric. This achievement, I believe, 
·will stand for a long time as one of the truly great and permanently 
valuable pieces of the SEC's work. Certainly, nothing else the SEC 
has done has yet equalled it. 
However, the breaking apart of holding company systems was 
only half of the job envisioned by the Act. Still undone is the equally 
important task of charting a course for the integration of utility 
operating companies for the expanding tasks that lie before them-
including the achievement of economies of scale and the kind of 
reliability that can only come from coordination made possible by 
larger systems under single ownership. While some progress has 
recently been made in this direction it has been made voluntarily by 
utility company managements without help from the SEC. 
Professor Cary has been quite blunt in his criticisms of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (ICC) for its inertness in the face of 
enormous problems of American railroads. It was the opposition 
of the ICC to earlier and more vigorous versions of the Transporta-
tion Act that helped materially to delay and, in some cases, make 
virtually impossible integration and financial revival of American 
rail systems. To Professor Cary's credit it should be observed that he 
has done no more than suggest that if the integration job is to be 
done under the Public Utility Holding Company Act someone else 
should do it-preferably the Federal Power Commission. To the 
contrary, it might be observed that the speed and excellence of the 
SEC's job of breaking up nonintegrated utility holding company 
systems was due in good measure to the fact that it was done by an 
agency free of ingrained modes of thought and of embroilment with 
the perennial and nagging tasks of account classification and rate 
making. The SEC has been jurisdictionally aggressive in other areas. 
It would seem rather odd if it were to turn its back on the area in 
which it did its greatest work and established an enduring reputa-
tion; indeed it would be rather sad if it no longer felt equal to the 
task. But it would be even worse if it kept the power but failed to 
exercise it. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Just as no man can write a book which does not, in some way, 
reflect his basic drives and character so too can no man write a 
review. From this book emerges the image of a man of extraordinary 
integrity and courage who hungered for and achieved a good measure 
of effectiveness and independence in his job as Chairman of the 
SEC. But his book is, perhaps, still too close to that era of his life 
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to enable him to separate fully those aspects of it which exemplify 
his particular bent from those which exemplify permanent principles 
and mainstream meanin~. 
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